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THE HEALTH QUEUING GAME
KJETIL K. HAUGEN and HELGE BREMNES
Abstract. This paper studies agent-to-agent games in competition for a free public
resource. The resource is not evidently scarce, scarcity may, however, be the equi-
librium outcome. The agents’ attributes may differ as well as quality parameters
between different public resources. The examples are taken from the health sector.
Based on simple two-player simultaneous games of complete information, results re-
garding agent equilibrium quality choices are derived. Most notably, Nash equilibria
of the type: very ill patients choose low quality hospitals (denoted adverse patient
allocation in the paper) are demonstrated. Furthermore, it is argued that a situation
characterized by patients with relatively mild diseases but large patient variability
(big differences between patients regarding the given disease) and a health system
with medium competition are prime candidates for Nash equilibria characterized by
such Adverse patient allocation effects.
1. Introduction
Modern health care industry consumes vast economic resources1. Judging modern
medical technology and research, it seems hard to predict decreased future resource
consumption. Consequently, as a large share of world health care systems are
publicly financed, correct regulatory action now and in the future may be of critical
importance.
Most of today’s health care systems apply a mixture of private and public fi-
nancing mechanisms. A structural difference may however be observed between
countries with “mostly private” (like USA) as opposed to countries with “mostly
public” (like Norway or Sweden) financing mechanisms. In countries with a ma-
jority of private financing systems, insurance mechanisms dominate while publicly
financed systems rely on standard public budgeting mechanisms or (lately) some
production oriented mechanisms. As most publicly financed systems supply free
services2 (publicly provided public goods) and health production-capacity is lim-
ited, some rationing mechanism apart from pricing is necessary – typically queuing.
The typical situation – in a country with mostly public health service – may
hence be characterized by publicly provided “normal” health production, while rel-
atively small segments are covered by private agents, either for specialized services
MSC (2010): primary 91A05, 91A80.
Keywords: Health, Queuing, Game Theory, Adverse patient allocation.
1In 1991, US spent $2.1 trillion or 13% of GDP on public and private health care [3]
2Some public services apply pricing, but the price is relatively symbolic - no real relation to
the true production cost.
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like plastic surgery or for “normal” services and patients with high willingness to
pay.
In this paper, we focus on queue formation in a publicly provided (free) health
care system. We assume the existence of quality differences between hospitals
as well as differences (degree of illness) between patients. We adopt a situation,
close to today’s situation in Norway3, where patients can choose “freely” among
different health providers. This freedom of choice introduces difficult decisions for
patients and ultimately a gaming situation from the patients’ point of view. Any
patient would (obviously) like to choose the best hospital with the smallest queue,
and conflicts of interest (between patients) will emerge. This situation of conflict
is analysed through simple 2 player simultaneous games of complete information.
Section 2 presents a short survey of relevant literature. Section 3 introduces
the game models, while the (seemingly) most interesting results are derived in
Section 4. The paper ends with some conclusions and suggestions for further work
in Section 5.
2. Literature
Even though health related research on queues (waiting lists) has become fairly
comprehensive, most papers either utilize “standard” general equilibrium ap-
proaches or “engineering-oriented” queuing theory. Both these branches of litera-
ture are surely important and provide important insight into queuing behaviour.
However, fundamental questions regarding agents’ equilibrium choices within the
theoretical framework of game theory are more sparsely treated. Some noteworthy
exceptions do, however, exist. Most of these papers deal with games between reg-
ulator/hospital and patient or between hospital/physician and patient. Iversen [6]
looks at the game between hospitals and regulators and claims that waiting lists
may form a strategic signal for the hospital as long waiting lists may force the
regulator to soften the budget constraint. Iversen shows that, given a Stackel-
berg game formulation (as opposed to a simultaneous game) with the hospital
as leader, the equilibrium results in excessive waiting times. In another paper,
Iversen [7] treats a somewhat different situation where a “small” private sector
may induce equilibrium outcomes with longer waiting lists. Barros et al. [1] and
Gonza´lez [5] study “cream skimming” – a situation characterized by public sec-
tor treating “hard patients” and private sector “skimming the cream” or treating
“easy patients”. Barros et al. [1] conclude (perhaps not too surprisingly) that
partial “cream skimming” is the typical equilibrium outcome. Farnworth [4] looks
at a game between patient and hospital where prices charged to patients are a pol-
icy instrument for altering waiting times. He shows that altering prices at some
institutions may affect waiting lists at all institutions. Johansen [8] looks at a pa-
tient to patient game. He examines, as opposed to our case where player actions
3Even though we refer to Norway several places in this article, methods and results applies
to a general public health service system where queuing is the rationing mechanism and patients
are allowed the freedom of hospital choice.
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involve choice between hospitals, a one hospital situation4 where the players (pa-
tients) make timing decisions. His main conclusion involves Nash equilibria in
mixed strategies as the typical outcome.
3. Game models
3.1. The reference model – Equal hospitals and patients and no initial
queues
We assume a simplified setting with 2 hospitals H1, H2 and two patients P1, P2
where the patients are assumed players in a two-player simultaneous game of com-
plete information. Furthermore, the player actions are assumed to be discrete
choices among the two hospitals, and there is no pricing in the system. Queuing
is assumed as the (typical) choice of rationing mechanism. Finally, we assume
no initial queues and the queue-formation is hence determined by the equilibrium.
Pay-offs (or utilities) of the game are assumed equal for all possible decision combi-
nations apart from the only difference due to queuing. That is, a is the (positive)
utility for any player given queuing5 (patients choose the same hospital) while
b, b > a is the utility without queuing.
Given the above assumptions as well as player rationality (utility maximization),













Figure 1. A normal form game – equal patients and hospitals.
4Strictly speaking, Johansen investigates a general model where the resource not necessarily
is a hospital.
5Surely, if two patients demand health services at the same (public) hospital with free “pro-
duction” capacity, only one of the patients will have to wait. As such, this model may perhaps
be better explained by assuming a lottery between patients on who will go first. As both patients
are assumed “equal”, such a lottery should imply equal queuing probability for both, and the
positive (expected) utility in this case may for instance be expressed by b = a− 1
2
c. Here, c may
be interpreted as the (discounted) cost of queuing.
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As Figure 1 indicates, the game is a standard “Chicken” game6 with three
Nash equilibria, 2 pure (shown by best reply intersections in Figure 1)7 and one in
mixed strategies (not shown in Figure 1). The practical meaning is straightforward
to interpret: minimal congestion, seemingly the politicaly “correct” solution. The
intuition is also straightforward, given two equal patients choosing between 2 equal
hospitals, with some element of congestion costs; patients ought to end up by
avoiding queues.
3.2. Equal hospitals and unequal patients
If we assume that one of the patients is very ill8, while the other is not, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the “very-ill” patient (say P1) has a utility loss (compared
to P2) by a queue-situation. Consequently, by adding a parameter µ reflecting this














Figure 2. A normal form game – unequal patients and equal hospitals.
As Figure 2 indicates, with the reasonable assumption of µ > 0, the Nash
equilibria are unchanged. Surely, this is perfectly sensible, as the only difference
between figures 1 and 2 is extra congestion costs.
6The so called “Chicken game” is well treated in Game Theory literature (see for instance [2])
and refers to the game where two hooligans drive against each other on a narrow road, the first
to swerve looses faces against his peers, if no one swerves, fatal consequences of a car crash is the
“reward” for both players. Strictly speaking, the games which are named “Chicken games” here
are not. However, the solution structure (i.e number and type of Nash equilibria) correspond to
that of Chicken games. Consequently, we choose to use this naming convention throughout the
paper.
7Circles denote best reply for patient 1 while squares denote best reply for patient 2.
8Strictly speaking, the model meaning of this term is perhaps better described by “the pa-
tient’s health deteriorates more while waiting”.
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To sum up: These simple models show that under an assumption of no quality
difference between hospitals and queuing costs, patients choose the hospital with
the smallest queue and the outcome is capacity utilization. This is probably the
kind of situation that (at least) Norwegian authorities would prefer; equally good
hospitals and minimal queue building.
3.3. Unequal hospitals and equal patients
This situation will prove to be more interesting. As this case implies variations in
hospital quality, a very important distinction will have to be made. Either hospital
quality is observed independently of queue length or not. The point is simple.
From a patient’s point of view, an observed queue (as the only reliable available
information on hospital quality) ought to be interpreted as a signal. Rational
agents would not queue up – unless they have private information – if alternative
hospitals with smaller or non-existing queues exist. Consequently9, a long queue
should imply better quality than a short one.
For the time being, however, let us assume the opposite situation. That is,
hospital quality is observable independently of queue length. This merely means
that an observed queue does not imply anything on hospital quality, only disutility
of queuing. Given this situation, keeping the congestion cost structure of previous
cases (a, b, b > a) and adding a new parameter β > 0 being the positive benefit of
choosing H1 over H2
10 yields the game of Figure 3.
a + β











Figure 3. A normal form game – equal patients and unequal hospitals with no utility-signal of
queuing.
The game of Figure 3 adds a slightly more complex game theoretic analysis.
Two basic situations need to be investigated:
i) a+ β < b,
9This situation seems to be fairly close to the Norwegian system as of today [9].
10This assumption implies (without lack of generality) that hospital 1 is strictly better than
hospital 2.
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ii) a+ β > b.
3.3.1. The game of Figure 3 when a+ β < b. If
a+ β < b or a < b− β,
then (obviously), given the assumption of β > 0
a < b+ β
and again the situation imply the “Chicken” game.
3.3.2. The game of Figure 3 when a+β > b. This situation does, however,
imply an interesting change. Let us first interpret the meaning. If a + β > b or,
equivalently, β > b− a, the added utility in favour of hospital 1 is larger than the
congestion costs. Or more popularly, the above defined situation may be seen as
a situation with a large hospital quality variation.
Half of the best replies are determined by the initial assumption of a + β > b.
It is, however, necessary to establish the sign of (b+ β)− a. Assuming
a > b+ β ⇒ β < a− b ⇒ β < 0
which clearly violates the assumption of β > 0 and consequently, a < b+β. Hence,
it is straightforward to see that a unique pure Nash equilibrium exists, as shown
in Figure 4.
a + β











Figure 4. Nash equilibrium in the game of Figure 3.
This situation is intuitive and logical. When the quality difference among hos-
pitals is large enough, patients choose the best hospital with queuing as the con-
sequence. However, this may well be a fairly “unpleasant” solution as seen by
a politician. If patients choose only quality hospitals, the remaining (low quality)
hospitals will ultimately lack patients. An obvious consequence would be a hospi-
tal shut down, seemingly not a very “politically correct” solution – at least not in
a sparsely populated and geographically complex country such as Norway.
THE HEALTH QUEUING GAME 165
As discussed initially in this paragraph, the above modelling reflects a situation
where the queue-length does not imply a quality signal. In health systems such as
the Norwegian one today, the only quality information available is queue lengths
(or waiting lists as Norwegians tend to name them). Any patient observing very
different queue lengths among hospitals (with seemingly equal quality) for the same
type of treatment, would be very silly if she did not ask the following question:
If all hospitals are equally good, how come that most patients choose a subset of
hospitals? Obviously, in such a system, a long queue must imply a positive quality
signal.
The above description calls for a game of incomplete (and asymmetric) infor-
mation with sets of “informed” patients and sets of “uninformed” patients. Such
an approach is clearly feasible, but judged as out of the scope of this paper11. It
is however possible to judge consequences of such a situation by a simple approx-
imative technique. If queue-length indicates (positive) hospital quality, it should
mean that the “cost of congestion” ought to be smaller given the ii)-situation as
opposed to the i)-situation. After all if the length of the queue gives a signal to
the patient that the hospital at hand is good, the rational patient would be less
reluctant in choosing such a hospital - or be more willing to accept queuing.
Consequently, we can compare the two situations by simply judging the rea-
soning in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 given a is closer to b. If b − a is decreasing,
it is simple to realize that the situation of subsection 3.3.1 becomes less probable
compared to the situation of subsection 3.3.2 – that is, a Nash equilibrium where
both patients choose one hospital is more likely. Hence, if it is plausible to assume
that a public health system that has been run without competitive forces like
the Norwegian one, has a large quality variation (typically also with significant
asymmetric information between patients) making waiting lists public, may not
be a very good idea as the above argumentation indicates a possible outcome of
increased congestion.
The point is simple. If the politicians’ intention to make waiting lists public is
a hope that patients will choose hospitals with small queues, the actual outcome
may very well be the opposite. This kind of result ought to be interesting for
Norwegian health officials.
4. Both unequal hospitals and unequal patients
As the headline suggests, it is perhaps not too surprising that the final section
contains a judgement of the more general situation. Surely, this case contains all
the other cases discussed, along with a large set of other situations. We see no
point in a full examination of the general case which, in essence, will merely be
a complete taxonomy of two-player two-strategy one-shot games.
However, it may prove to be interesting to see if a situation where “very ill”
patients are forced (by the game) to choose “very low-quality” hospitals is obtain-
able. We use the term adverse patient allocation to characterize such outcomes.
Surely, such outcomes are definitely not what either patients, hospitals or society
would welcome.
11An obvious candidate for the “category of further work”.
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In order to judge this question, a more general game model is needed. Actually,
“joining” figures 2 and 3 will serve the purpose as shown in Figure 5.
a + β











Figure 5. A game with both unequal hospitals and patients.
As indicated by Figure 5, this is a game between a “very ill” patient (P1) and
a less ill patient (P2) choosing between two hospitals of which H1 is better than
H2. That is, β, µ > 0. We also keep the assumption of b > a.
Given theses assumptions and the case of “very ill” patients choosing “very bad”
hospitals, the pure unique Nash equilibrium of P1 choosing H2 and P2 choosing
H1 is the candidate for examination as indicated by the circle of Figure 5.
In order to secure (H2, H1) as a pure Nash equilibrium, inequalities (4.1), (4.2)
must (at least) be satisfied:
b > a+ β − µ (4.1)
b+ β > a (4.2)
Starting with (4.2), we get
b+ β > a ⇒ β > a− b. (4.3)
But, by the initial assumptions β > 0, b > a, the equation (4.3) will always be
satisfied.
Examining (4.1) yields (by adding β on each side)
b > a+ β − µ ⇒ b+ β > a− µ+ 2β.
Consequently, as b+ β > a− µ+ 2β > a− µ, we have
b+ β > a− µ
or P1’s best reply to P2 choosing H2 is H1. That is, in order to avoid the “Chicken”
outcome and secure a pure and unique Nash equilibrium of (H2, H1)-type, it is
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also necessary that equation (4.4) is satisfied
a+ β > b. (4.4)
To sum up: both equations (4.4) and (4.1) must be satisfied simultaneously.
Rewriting these equations slightly gives
b > a+ β − µ ⇒ β < b− a+ µ
and
a+ β > b ⇒ β > b− a
or
b− a < β < b− a+ µ. (4.5)
Inequality (4.5) can be seen as an interval for possible β-values, i.e., β ∈ [b−a, b−
a+ µ]. One interesting and obvious conclusion to draw from equation (4.5) is the
simple (and somewhat surprising) fact that if we judge the length of the above
interval (computed as (b− a+ µ− (b− a) = µ) as an indicator on the likelihood
of occurrence12 of this Nash equilibrium, only the value of µ or the difference
between patients are relevant.
This may be interpreted as follows: In order to minimize the occurrence of this
type of equilibrium, a regulator should – for any value of β (hospital quality) –
minimize µ or try to make patients as equally ill (or fresh) as possible.
The fact that a regulatory objective may involve “picking” patients that are
equally ill (or equally fresh) is perhaps not directly intuitive.
Another striking fact of equation (4.5) may be observed by conducting the fol-
lowing argument: Assume that congestion costs (b−a) as well as patient differences
(µ) are given. Avoiding this outcome may be done in two ways, either by making
the hospital quality difference sufficiently large or small. Note however, that this
type of regulatory action is fairly dangerous. If one fails to make it either small
enough or large enough, nothing happens; (either β must be made < b − a or
β must be made > b− a+ µ.
5. Conclusions and further work
5.1. Basic findings
To sum up, there are two basic findings in this paper. First, we have demonstrated
(in subsection 3.3) that, given sufficient quality difference between hospitals, a pure
unique Nash equilibrium of both patients choosing the “best” hospital is predicted.
This may be seen as an explanation of why the introduction of free hospital choice
may actually lead to increased waiting lists. The fact that patients prefer quality
hospitals if the quality difference is large enough compared to congestion costs is
surely neither surprising nor counter intuitive. As such, this finding may seem
banal from a game theoretic point of view. However, as the political debate of for
instance Norway strongly indicates that making waiting lists public should help
patients avoid the queues and hence lead to reduced waiting lists, such a finding
might still be of regulatory interest. Actually, it could be argued that making
12This seems like a reasonable judgement.
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waiting lists publicly available may not be the correct regulatory action if the aim
is to reduce waiting lists.
Second, and perhaps more important, the findings of Section 4 indicate the
existence of Nash equilibria predicting adverse patient allocation. In this context,
adverse patient allocation means a situation where the patients with the greatest
needs choose the hospitals of lowest quality13. Consequently, interpreting equa-
tion (4.5) somewhat more might be interesting both from a practical as well as
a regulatory point of view.
If we compare health care systems with high and low competition, the cen-
tral parameter of equation (4.5) is β, representing the quality differences between
hospitals. It is reasonable to assume that high competition will drive hospitals to-
wards equal quality and hence β → 0. For a given positive value of the congestion
costs (b − a) the regulatory action is obvious – increase competition. However,
as equation (4.5) also indicates, the opposite regulatory action is possible. Given
congestion costs, (b− a) and patient differences, (µ), decreasing competition (i.e.
increasing β) so that β > b− a+ µ secures the non-satisfaction of equation (4.5).
The conclusion, perhaps somewhat counter intuitive, is that health systems with
medium competition are the risky ones. If competition is high enough or low
enough, equation (4.5) is difficult to satisfy.
An alternative way of viewing this situation is to focus on diagnosis. As b − a
represents congestion costs, it is reasonable to state that severe illness such as
cancer or heart disease should imply large congestion costs or high b−a-values while
less severe cases such as rheumatic disease have small b− a-values. Consequently,
for a given competitive level (given β), the adverse patient allocation mechanism is
less likely to occur for severe cases, which is good news. On the other hand, cases
with large patient variability (large µ) indicate the satisfaction of equation (4.5).
To sum up: A situation characterized by a relatively mild14 disease but large
patient variability and a health system with medium competition are the typical
candidates for satisfaction of equation (4.5). Treatment of rheumatic disease in
Norway may perhaps fit such a description fairly well. Note, however, that even
severe diseases such as cancer may fit our description of adverse patient allocation
if patient variability is large enough and competition is low enough. In such a case,
both β and µ are large and perhaps large enough to satisfy (4.5).
5.2. Model criticism
The fact that our game-modelling is simplified may of course be criticized . What
would happen if the number of players (patients) and strategies (hospitals) in-
creased? After all, the real world contains more than 2 patients and 2 hospitals.
Surely, special effects may arise, but it seems safe to conclude that the main struc-
tural consequences will remain.
13Obviously, this situation interpreted as adverse patient allocation implies a reasonable un-
derlying assumption of suboptimal social welfare. It is hard to argue that allocating the most
needing patients to the hospitals of lowest quality maximizes social welfare.
14“Mild” should be interpreted (modelwise) as a disease with relatively low health deteriora-
tion due to waiting.
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Some might object to the choice of a simultaneous game. After all, patient de-
cisions on hospital choice are not made simultaneously but (perhaps) sequentially.
From a practical point of view, such a model criticism may seem reasonable, but
still; patients must make choices on where to take treatment without knowing
what other patients at that time choose. Hence, our simplified description may
not be so bad after all.
The fact that this type of situation is full of asymmetric information is obvious.
Patients will not know their opponent players’ types, and patient knowledge on
hospital quality may differ between patients. To a certain extent, the arguments
of subsection 3.3, make up for such considerations, but as stated there, such an
approach deserves a paper of its own.
The most significant objection that may be raised against the modelling and re-
sults of this paper is perhaps the implicit assumption underlying (Sub)Sections 3.2
and 4 of free hospital choice regardless of disease. The meaning is straightforward.
It may well be that a regulator predicts the consequences of free hospital choice as
discussed here and chooses to lock special patients to special hospitals. If this is
the case, the gaming problems discussed previously are of course less interesting.
On the other hand, if a regulator makes such a choice, the concept of free hospital
choice becomes misleading, and it may be argued that a regulator bites his own
tail. Even if this is a possible practical outcome, it seems obvious that only spe-
cial (very severe cases) may be embraced by such an arrangement. As such, our
modelling may still be valid but within a subset of diagnostic cases.
5.3. Generality of results
Finally, it is clear that the modelling and results of this paper are not restricted
to health services only. The generality of modelling, models and results are surely
applicable to a wider set of public services – typically categorized as public goods in
economic theory. Education and free legal services may serve as typical examples.
In practice, some differences may of course need remodelling – public education
implies a re-queuing mechanism for instance. But, given an educational system
without re-queuing, our case would transform nicely to the existence of Nash
equilibria where the good students end up in the bad universities. Something
perhaps fairly familiar for those acquainted with the Scandinavian educational
systems.
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